Az Ungváry
and Irodalom Kft. v. Hungary (Application no. 64520/10, 3 December 2013) ügyben
egy hét bíróból álló tanács ítélkezett.
Ungváry Krisztián történész a lehető legszűkebben, 4:3 arányban nyert a
magyar állammal szemben. Az Egidijus Küris bíró által
jegyzett különvéleményhez a tanács elnöke Guido Raimondi és Peer
Lorenzen bírók csatlakoztak. A magyar államot elmarasztaló ítéletet Işıl Karakaş,
Sajó András, Nebojša Vučinić és Helen Keller szavazatával hozták meg.
Az Élet és Irodalmat kiadó
Irodalom Kft. ennél jóval simábban, 7:0 arányban lett pernyertes.
A történész a strasbourgi bírósághoz benyújtott keresetében 10.739 euró
vagyoni, 6000 euró nem vagyoni kártérítést, valamint a magyarországi eljárásban
felmerült költségeinek a megtérítését kérte. (§ 78.)
A bíróság ezzel szemben
pusztán 7000 euró vagyoni kártérítést ítélt meg, pont annyit, amennyit
Ungvárynak kellett kifizetnie dr. Kiss Lászlónak a magyarországi eljárásban (§§
20, 80.). A többségi vélemény teljes egészében elutasította a nem vagyoni
kártérítésre vonatkozó kérelmet, és kiemelte, hogy a magyar állam jogsértésének
megállapítása önmagában megfelelő jóvátétel (§ 81.). A történésznek a strasbourgi
eljárás során keletkezett 1800 eurós ügyvédi és egyéb költségeit a magyar állam
fizeti.
Az Élet és Irodalom kiadójának kereseti kérelmében foglaltakat minden
tekintetben elfogadta bíróság. Így a magyar államnak meg kell térítenie a kiadónak
a magyar eljárásban felmerült összes kiadását, valamint ezen felül a bíróság
megítélt 3000 euró nem vagyoni kártérítést, és 1800 euró ügyvédi költséget is.
Részletek az ítéletből:
„7. On 18 May
2007 Élet
és Irodalom published
a study (entitled The
Genesis of a Procedure – Dialógus in Pécs)
written by Mr Ungvary. The article dealt with the
actions of the security service against a spontaneous student peace movement (“Dialógus”)
active in Pécs and elsewhere in the country in the 1980s. The author stated inter alia that:
“... the Dialógus-affair
had demonstrated ... how closely the Ministry of the Interior and the ‘social
organisations’ – which had taken over some State-security functions covertly,
in case of necessity – had been intertwined”.
(„A Dialógus-békecsoport elleni eljárások egyfajta
állatorvosi lóként is mutatják az állambiztonság változatos bürokratikus és
nagyrészt még a pártállamban is jogi alapot nélkülöző zaklató intézkedéseinek
alkalmazását, valamint az BM és más, szükség esetén rejtetten belügyi funkciót
átvevő "társadalmi szervezetek" szoros összefonódását”. A magyar nyelvű
forrásokat innen idézem)
8. The
lead of the article pointed out that the recent scandals exposing former agents
acting for the party-State’s security system covered up the fact that most
reporting for that system had been done through accidental, social or official
contacts (as had been the case with a Mr K., a judge of the Constitutional
Court at the material time, elected by Parliament), rather than by actual
agents.
The
lead contained the following passage:
“From the perspective of informing (besúgás)
and repression (megtorlás),
Officer J. W. ... and the nine “official contacts” (hivatalos
kapcsolat) proved to be a lot more important
... [in the Dialógus-affair],
[these official contacts including] Mr K. (today judge of the
Constitutional Court)... Their respective responsibilities are of course
different.”
„A besúgások és a megtorlás szempontjából sokkal
fontosabbnak bizonyult Walz János AC-39-es szt-tiszt, valamint a kilenc
"hivatalos kapcsolat". Petrétei József politikai munkatárs,
"Polgárdi" alkalmi operatív kapcsolat (feltehetően a JPTE egyik
tanára), Gáspár János egyetemi párttitkár, dr. Kiss László (ma alkotmánybíró),
a jogi kar párttitkára, valamint Gelencsér Imre (1983 áprilisáig) és Kovács
Lajos (1983 áprilisától) a jogi kar, Gyurcsány Ferenc, a tanárképző kar, Molnár
László, az egyetem és B. M. (nevét sajnos nem sikerült feloldanom), a Pollack
Mihály Műszaki Főiskola KISZ-titkárai. Felelősségük természetesen nekik is
különböző”.
The author argued that
Mr K., without being an actual agent,
“... was in regular and apparently collegial (kollégiális)
contact with the State security, quite often anticipating and exceeding its
expectations” ... “and as an official contact, he was busy as an informant (besúgó)
and demanding hard-line policies”.
„Elsősorban Molnár László és dr. Kiss László állt rendszeres és minden
jel szerint kollegiális kapcsolatban az állambiztonsággal, sok esetben elébe
menve elvárásainak. Érdekes módon a tanárképző kar párttitkára, Vonyó József
egyetlen alkalommal sem bukkan elő az iratokban: ez arra utal, hogy aki nem
akart, az párttitkárként is ki tudott maradni az állambiztonsággal való összefonódásból”.
9. In
the article, Mr Ungváry relied, inter alia, on documents available in the
Historical Archives of the State Security Service archived as a “strictly
confidential action plan”. Referring to the above material, he described the
role played by leaders of Pécs University – including Mr K., deputy secretary
of the local party committee between 1983 and 1988 – in assisting the security
operations.
Mr Ungváry characterised Mr K.’s attitude in
the Dialógus case as that of a “hardliner”, in comparison to other “social
contacts”. He recalled that Mr K. had ordered the removal of Dialógus’s poster,
saying that “the country did not need such an ... organisation [i.e.
Dialógus]”, and that he had reproached a candidate in the Communist youth
organisation’s elections for having been supported by Dialógus.
„Ennél súlyosabban viselkedett dr. Kiss László, aki 1983. március 24-én
utasította Gelencsér Imre jogi kari KISZ-titkárt arra, hogy azonnal szedje le a
Dialógus-plakátokat, mert "az országnak nincsen szüksége egy ilyen
"semleges" szervezetre, ezért ne is reklámozzák azt". Gelencsér
hiába jegyezte meg, hogy ezzel csak nagyobb feltűnést kelt, az utasítást végre
kellett hajtania”.
ii. Application of
those principles to the present case
49. The Court notes that the study contained
mostly a factual description of the events from the foundation of the Dialógus
movement until its dissolution in late 1983. It also included a detailed
account of specific actions of certain individuals. As regards Mr K., the
article stated that he had ordered the removal of the movement’s poster from
the university’s bulletin board, had prepared reports as a party member, and
had reproached a candidate in the Communist youth organisation’s elections for
having been supported by Dialógus. As it appears from the circumstances of the
case, these activities were not in dispute in the domestic proceedings.
50. The courts criticised the applicants for
having advanced remarks that in the “Dialógus-case” Mr K. had acted as “an
official contact” of the secret services, collaborated with them as a
quasi-agent, even exceeding what had been expected from such “official
contacts”, and had been a hardliner in comparison with other officials. The
domestic courts found that these statements were allegations of fact
susceptible to proof. The applicants never endeavoured to provide any
justification for these allegations, and their truthfulness has never been
proved. The applicants argued throughout the proceedings that the disseminated
statements did not constitute statements of facts, but were value judgments and
conclusions of a historian with sufficient factual background.
59. The Supreme Court concluded that the
impugned defamatory statement, in the absence of a factual ground, presented Mr
K. in a false light or was false. The Court finds that although the first
applicant did not prove that Mr K. and his reports had actually been
commissioned by the State security, it was nevertheless an undisputed fact that
he, as a party secretary, had produced reports on the Dialógus affair.
The Court finds that, on careful scrutiny, the
broader connotation of “cooperation” should have also been considered; and in
regard to that broader connotation, the restrictive interpretation of the
impugned terms of the article by the Supreme Court pre-empted the consideration
of other facts which were relevant to these terms and also the possibility to
consider them as opinion (see paragraphs 53 and 58 above) with sufficient
factual basis.
60. In view of the principal thesis of the
article (see paragraphs 7 and 19 above) it is plausible that the expressions
“reporting”, acting as “informant”, or “collegial contact” do not refer to
those activities being actually commissioned by the State security. The Supreme
Court understood these activities as belonging to his responsibilities within
the Party, without considering the relation thereof to the goals of the State
security.
The Court finds such a selective interpretation
of the impugned statements, with the resultant burden of proof incumbent on the
first applicant, hardly compatible with the demands of the most careful
scrutiny applicable in the present case.
62. As to the criterion of contribution to a
debate of general interest, the Court notes that the statements held against
the first applicant concerned the recent history of Hungary and aimed at
shedding new light on the functioning of the secret service and, in particular,
its reliance on public and party officials. The publication was based on
research done by Mr Ungváry, a known historian, who, as specified in the
introduction to the article, relied on material available in the Historical
Archives of the State Security.
63. Against this background, the Court observes
that various issues related to the Communist regime still appear to be open to
on-going debate between researchers, in the general public as well as in
Parliament (see paragraphs 19 and 24 above), and as such should be a matter of
general interest in contemporary Hungarian society. It considers that it is an
integral part of freedom of expression to seek historical truth and it is not
its role to arbitrate on the underlying historical issues, which are part of a
continuing debate between historians that shapes opinion as to the events which
took place and their interpretation (see Chauvy and Others, cited above, § 69).
It therefore concludes that this publication deserves the high level of
protection guaranteed to political discourse – and the press, in view of its
functions. However, these considerations are absent in the Supreme Court
judgment (see also paragraph 60 above).
68. Lastly, concerning the severity of the
sanction imposed, it is true that the applicant was subjected to civil-law,
rather than criminal, sanctions. However, he was ordered to pay a considerable
amount of money in damages and legal costs (see
Koprivica v. Montenegro, no. 41158/09, § 73, 22 November 2011). Moreover,
the Court considers that the measure applied, in a matter which affects Mr
Ungváry’s professional credibility as a historian, is capable of producing a
chilling effect. In this connection, the Court emphasises that a rectification
of the statement of facts had already been ordered by a national court; and the
subsequent sanctions were not strictly necessary to provide an adequate remedy
to Mr K. – who otherwise failed to claim in a proper form (see paragraph 20
above) a publication to give satisfaction at the expense of the perpetrator.
Részlet Egidijus
Küris bíró különvéleményéből:
10. The conduct of anyone who, under
totalitarian rule, chose to behave in a loyalist manner must be judged not only
from today’s perspective but also in the light of the reality of the situation
at the material time, including prevalent patterns of behaviour in a comparable
situation in that society, the behavioural options (if any) open to that person
in that situation, the realistic consequences of alternative conduct and the
assessment thereof by the person concerned. In the eyes of the law most of this
is irrelevant. Whether every single loyalist to such a regime or anyone who
informed its agents of any activities the regime discouraged, or anyone who
carried out a request or order of its secret service, can be categorised as
(and, where this is done publicly, accused of being) “an official contact”, “an
informant”, or “a quasi-agent” of that regime’s secret service is a matter of
political opinion, a moral judgment, an academic topic, and not a question to
be decided in court. What is legally relevant is that, if a dispute arises
regarding such public categorisation, which is tantamount to condemnation in
the eyes of the public at large, whoever disseminated the accusation must be
able to prove its accuracy, to prove that it is based on facts which have been
interpreted without prejudice.
11. I share the majority’s view that a
historian’s freedom to formulate judgments of this kind (provided they are
based on facts) is protected by Article 10 of the Convention. Yet I disagree
with the assessment that the Supreme Court, when finding against Mr Ungváry,
overstepped the line drawn by the provisions of that Article. […]Public opinion
condemns those persons who cooperated with the State security, even if they do
not fall within the actual category of ‘agent’ or ‘informant’. Therefore, if
someone is characterised, without a proper ground, as actually having carried
out such activities, this violates that person’s reputation, according to
public opinion.” Mr Ungváry offered no proof of his characterisation of Mr K.,
even at the national courts’insistence. The Supreme Court also took into
consideration the fact that, in the television interview, Mr Ungváry called Mr
K. (who by then had already denied the allegations) “trash”, obviously not a
scholarly term but an open insult, and apologised for having done so only in
the course of the ensuing criminal proceedings.
17. Because Mr Ungváry was unable to prove the
veracity of his assessment of Mr K.’s conduct, his assessment cannot be
considered legally defensible. The Supreme Court did not grant it legal
protection, and I support this view because there was no evidence that such
arbitrary categorisation of Mr K. contributed to any progressive development in
a democratic society. Now the Court has found in favour of Mr Ungváry, thereby
lending his statements at least some legal credence, notwithstanding the
failure of their author to substantiate them. Such a finding cannot but
encourage the publication, as opinions, of abusive statements wittingly
expressed in polysemous terms, even if the authors cannot prove their veracity,
when in fact the reader perceives them as statements of fact not distorted by
prejudice. Thus, this finding may have an undesirable cascade effect.
